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Abstract 
In this paper, we interpret the flow-performance relationship as an incentive 
scheme implicitly given to mutual fund managers by mutual fund investors. We show 
that the flow-performance relationship varies not only with economic activity but also 
across fund attributes. We provide evidence that the degree of convexity of the 
flow-performance relationship has a positive effect on the magnitude of tournament 
behavior. Different from the conventional tournament hypothesis, we show that 
although the convexity of the flow-performance relationship does produce implicit 
incentives for fund managers to modify risk-taking behavior as a function of their 
prior performance, whether or not the mid-year losers increase the risk of their 
portfolios highly depends on the convexity degree of the flow-performance 
relationship.   i
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ..........................................................................................................i 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................ii 
I Introduction...............................................................................................................1 
II Literature Review....................................................................................................5 
III Data and Methodology...........................................................................................8 
(A) Sample Description..............................................................................................8 
(B) Variable Definitions .............................................................................................9 
(C) Methodology......................................................................................................13 
IV Flow-Performance Relationship..........................................................................14 
(A) The Shape of Flow-Performance Relationship..................................................14 
(B) Effect of Economic Activity on the Flow-Performance Relationship...............15 
(C) Effects of Fund Attributes on the Flow-Performance Relationship...................18 
(D) The Joint Effects on the Flow-Performance Relationship.................................20 
V Tournament Behavior............................................................................................21 
VI Conclusion.............................................................................................................24 
References...................................................................................................................26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ii
Acknowledgements 
I am deeply grateful to my teachers, friends and family in continually supporting 
me during the process of the thesis writing. Their assistance and encouragement make 
the completion of the thesis possible.   
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest appreciation to my 
advisor, Prof. Anthony S Tay, for his valuable guidance and impressive patience. 
Throughout the study, Prof. Tay made invaluable efforts to help and offer me detailed 
suggestions to improve my thesis. I am also indebted to my examiner, Prof. Tomoki 
Fujii, whose comments and suggestions helped strengthen my thesis. My appreciation 
also extends to all my teachers who have helped me to develop the fundamental and 
essential academic competence. I would also like to thank Ms. Li Sun for helping me 
with the techniques of SAS.   
Many thanks go to all my classmates, especially Gregorio, Jing, Leming, Xiaojun 
and Gurmeet, for their everlasting accompany and support. My thanks also go to my 
friends in China for their understanding and encouragement. Last but not least, thanks 
go to my dearest parents and my elder brother for being the strongest mental support 
whenever I was frustrated. Finally, I would like to dedicate this study to my parents 
who always say that they feel so proud of me. 
 
 
  
  1
I Introduction 
During the last two decades, the mutual fund industry experienced tremendous 
growth both in the number of funds and amount of assets under management. It is not 
surprising that this industry has attracted a lot of attention both from the academic and 
professional communities. Since Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), there 
have been extensive studies on the relationship between investment flows and past 
performance demonstrating that consumers react strongly and asymmetrically to 
historical returns.   
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) put forward the tournament hypothesis for the 
mutual fund industry, that is, given that the compensation for mutual fund managers is 
often structured as a flat fee plus a percentage of the level of assets under management, 
and given that the profession currently assesses and reports fund performance on an 
annual basis, the convex flow-performance relationship provides implicit incentives 
for managers to alter the risk of their portfolios.   
This topic has attracted a lot of attention and empirical verification from studies 
such as Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Koski and Pontiff (1999), Li and Tiwari (2005), 
etc. However, recent studies are less supportive of this conjecture. Busse (2001) 
challenges the evidence in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) by showing that monthly 
results consistent with tournament hypothesis disappear with daily data and pointed 
out that the puzzle arises from biases in the monthly volatility estimates attributable to 
daily return autocorrelation. Goriaev, Nijma and Werker (2005) complement this 
methodological problem by showing that the source of spurious evidence is not from 
temporal correlation in returns but cross-correlation between idiosyncratic fund 
returns. Some researchers have tried to reconcile these seemingly contradictory 
empirical findings in mutual fund tournament behavior. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
and Qiu (2003) point out that the importance of termination risk on risk-taking 
behavior by fund managers. Hu et al. (2006) suggest a U-shaped tournament behavior. 
Olivier and Tay (2008) put forward the “Conditional Tournament Hypothesis”, that is,  
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mid-year underperformers increase the risk of their portfolio only when economic 
activity is strong. 
In this paper, we are primarily interested in exploring what types of incentives the 
convexity of flow-performance relationship creates for funds to manipulate the risk of 
their portfolios. Since these incentives are affected by the strength and the convexity 
of the flow-performance relationship, we begin with an attempt to analyze how the 
convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies both over time along the 
business cycle and cross-sectionally with fund attributes. On the one hand, we explore 
the time-series factor which could affect the convexity of flow-performance 
relationship. We predict that economic activity measured by real GDP growth rate 
could affect the sensitivity of investor flows to previous performance. On the other 
hand, we explore the cross-sectional factors which could affect the convexity. We 
mainly consider fund attributes, such as fund age, total fees and family size, which 
have already been shown in previous literature but without consistent views of their 
effects on the investor flows. 
Testing these conjectures with monthly return data for more than 2000 actively 
managed US domestic equity funds, we find that the convexity of the 
flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of economic activity. We also 
find that the convexity of the fund flow-performance relationship increases with 
fund’s age and family size, while it decreases with the fund’s total fees. This evidence 
provides reasonable explanation why the convexity degree of the flow-performance 
relationship varies from sample to sample and implicates varying implicit incentives 
for the tournament behavior. 
Since the risk-shifting incentives are affected by the strength and the convexity 
of the flow-performance relationship, we investigate the link between the sources of 
the convexity in the flow-performance relationship and the inter-temporal risk-shifting 
behavior of mutual fund managers. We find evidence supporting our predictions both 
in time-series and in cross-sectional perspectives. In particular, from the time-series  
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perspective, we find that economic activity has a significantly positive effect on the 
magnitude of tournament behavior. This fact is consistent with the conclusion that the 
convexity of flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of economic 
activity of Olivier and Tay (2008). From the cross-sectional perspective, we find that 
fund age and family size have a significantly positive effect on the magnitude of 
tournament behavior, while fund total fees have a significantly negative effect on the 
magnitude of tournament behavior. Hence, our results strongly suggest that 
risk-shifting behavior of fund managers is consistent with the implicit incentives 
generated from the flow-performance relationship. 
Unlike the conventional tournament hypothesis: mid-year loser funds, those with 
below-median performance, tend to increase portfolio’s volatility in the latter part of 
the year more than mid-year winner funds. Based on our results, we conclude that the 
convexity of the flow-performance relationship in the mutual fund industry does 
produce positive implicit incentives for fund managers to modify risk-taking behavior 
as a function of their prior performance. However, whether or not the mid-year losers 
increase the risk of their portfolios highly depends on the convexity degree of the 
flow-performance relationship. 
This paper is closely related to Olivier and Tay (2008) who explore the 
time-varying incentives along the business cycle and the implication for the 
tournament puzzle. They show that the convexity of the flow-performance 
relationship varies with economic activity and provide evidence supporting a 
conditional tournament hypothesis, that is, poor mid-year performers increase the risk 
of their portfolio only when economic activity is strong. Our main contribution is to 
carry this intuition further by investigating not only the effect of economic activity on 
the flow-performance relationship, but also the effects of fund attributes on the 
flow-performance relationship, and then to explore comprehensively how the implicit 
incentives created from the varying flow-performance relationship shape the 
tournament behavior.  
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Several previous studies examine the asymmetric flow-performance relationship. 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that search cost is an important determinant of fund 
flows. Using three proxies, they show that funds with higher fees experience a higher 
sensitivity of fund flows to previous performance. And fund flows are also directly 
related to fund family size and current media attention which lower the search costs. 
Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) carry this intuition further by constructing a model to 
examine how the participation costs affect fund flows and show that funds with lower 
participation costs are characterized by a less convex flow-performance relationship. 
They provide evidence that funds with high marketing fees, and affiliated with larger 
family complexes experience less convexity in the flow-performance relationship. 
Another branch of the literature focuses on the termination risk. Hu et al. (2006) 
provide evidence that funds with younger managers, who face greater employment 
risk, have more convex U-shaped relative risk-prior performance relations. 
Our work differs from these studies in several aspects: firstly, we consider not 
only fund characteristics as potential factors affecting flow-sensitivity to previous 
performance but also the dynamic feature of flow-performance relationship along the 
business cycle, as in Kosowski (2006) and Olivier and Tay (2008). All these 
differences make our work currently the most comprehensive one in exploring the 
convexity of flow-performance relationship. Secondly, we investigate the link 
between the factors affecting the convexity of the flow-performance relationship and 
the inter-temporal risk-shifting behavior of fund managers. We find evidence that the 
convexity degree of the flow-performance relationship has a positive impact on the 
magnitude of tournament behavior. Finally, our conclusion provides a fresh 
perspective on the literature of the tournament hypothesis and gives reasonable 
explanation of the previous contradictory empirical findings in mutual fund 
tournament hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we review 
related literature, with a particular focus on the factors affecting the convexity of  
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flow-performance relationship and debates of the tournament hypothesis in the mutual 
fund industry, and then motivate our testable hypotheses. Section III describes the 
data and methodology we employ in our empirical analysis, while section IV and V 
detail the findings of regression tests we run to support our conclusions. In the final 
section, we summarize the results and put forward some concluding remarks. 
II Literature Review 
Many recent studies analyze the determinants of the behavior of mutual fund 
investors, concentrating on the relation between net flows to mutual fund and their 
past performance. Ippolito (1992) and Gruber (1996) document a clear positive 
impact of risk-adjusted as well as raw past performance on subsequent net fund flows. 
Since Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) showed that the 
flow-performance relationship appears to be convex, there have been extensive and 
convincing empirical evidences on the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. 
That is, investors respond asymmetrically to the past performance: the mutual funds 
that performed worse than the competitors do not experience as significant an outflow 
of invested capital. 
Now there is a large literature examining the determinants of the convexity of the 
flow-performance relationship, especially the effects of fund attributes such as fund 
size, age, expense ratio, family size, etc. However, there is no consensus about the 
determinants of the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997) apply a semi-parametric model to examine the flow-performance 
relationship and find that younger funds’ flows are more sensitive to recent 
performance but older funds suffer more convex flow-performance relationship. Their 
results illustrate that compared to the pattern of younger funds, outflows of older 
funds do not increase dramatically at the worst performance levels. However, flows 
do increase sharply for the best-performing funds as the case of younger funds. Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) focus on search costs as one important determinant of fund flows 
and predict that investors would purchase those funds that are easier or less costly for  
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them to identify. Using three measures of search costs (i.e., complex size, marketing 
and distribution expenditures, and media coverage), they find that funds with high 
marketing expense enjoy a much stronger flow-performance relationship. Funds 
affiliated with larger families will receive greater inflows, and the flow-performance 
relationship will be stronger for larger complexes. Contrary to Sirri and Tufano (1998), 
Hu et al. (2006) find that the degree of the convexity of flow-performance relationship 
decreases with the fund’s expense ratio. However, the fund manager’s experience 
(measured by age) does not have a significant effect on the convexity of the 
flow-performance relationship. Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) provide evidence that 
funds with lower participation costs have a higher flow-sensitivity to medium 
performance and a lower flow-sensitivity to high performance than higher-cost funds, 
that is, funds with lower participation costs are characterized by a less convex 
flow-performance relationship. Using several proxies for participation costs, they find 
that funds with high marketing fees, and affiliated with larger family complexes 
experience less convexity in the flow-performance relationship. 
However, literature has seldom explored the dynamic feature of the 
flow-performance relationship. Kosowski (2006) examines the evolution of mutual 
fund performance and flow across the business cycle and shows that the mutual funds’ 
performance is negative on average but becomes positive during recessions. 
Cederburg (2008) explores the mutual fund investor behavior across the business 
cycle and provides evidence that investors chase returns when the economy is in 
expansion but this return-chasing behavior disappears when the economy is in 
recession. Olivier and Tay (2008) investigate the impact of economic activity on the 
convexity of the flow-performance relationship and find that even moderate 
fluctuations in economic activity can have a large impact on the sensitivity of flow to 
performance. 
A topic that has been of considerable recent interest within both the academic 
and professional communities is how portfolio managers adapt their investment  
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behavior to the economic incentives they are provided. Brown, Harlow, and Starks 
(1996) for the first time in the literature put forward the tournament hypothesis, given 
the convexity of the flow-performance relationship, the nature of the fee structure 
(and therefore, the compensation of mutual fund managers), and the profession’s 
current system of assessing and reporting fund performance on an annual basis. 
According to their tournament behavior hypothesis, mid-year loser funds, those with 
below-median performance, tend to increase portfolio’s volatility in the latter part of 
the year more than midyear winner funds. 
However, there is not a consensus on the shape of the relationship between 
interim performance and inter-temporal risk-shifting behavior. Brown, Harlow and 
Starks (1996) use contingency table methodology applied to monthly data of 334 
growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976-1991 and find evidence in favor of the 
tournament hypothesis. However, the results are highly sensitive to the sample period 
with the most recent sub-period providing the greatest support for the tournament 
hypothesis, a possible explanation given is that the tournament incentive effects 
become more pronounced with the growth in mutual fund. Koski and Pontiff (1999) 
use regression analysis and find a negative relation between interim performance and 
subsequent change in risk, which provide evidence of the tournament hypothesis. Li 
and Tiwari (2005) present empirical evidence consistent with the tournament 
hypothesis.  
Busse (2001) challenges the evidence in Brown et al. (1996) by maintaining that 
tournament behavior’s tests employing monthly data are miss-specified. In fact, 
standard deviations estimated with monthly data are biased by the daily 
autocorrelation in returns. Furthermore, when using tests based on daily data, the 
author finds no evidence of mid-year losers increasing the end-of-year risk level more 
than winners. If anything, the results indicate the opposite. Moreover, when correcting 
the statistical tests with empirical p-values, the actual monthly data produce results 
consistent with the absence of tournament behavior. Goriaev, Nijman and Werker  
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(2005) complement the methodological issues raised by Busse (2001). They also 
report that, depending on the sample period, the evidence in their sample as often 
supports the tournament hypothesis as it does the opposite result, namely, that poor 
half-year performers decrease the level of risk of their portfolio relative to that of 
strong half-year performers.   
Some researches have tried to reconcile these contradictory empirical findings in 
mutual fund tournament behavior. Taylor (2003) models an investment tournament 
where two funds with different mid-year performance compete to attract end-of-year 
cash flows, and are subject to a convex compensation schedule. On the one hand, 
when a manager competes against an exogenous benchmark winner funds invest in 
the index, whereas loser funds will tend to deviate from the index, thus “gambling”. 
On the other hand, when both managers are active and interact strategically, the 
winning manager is more likely to deviate from the index and the losing manager is 
more likely to choose a “safe” strategy. Olivier and Tay (2008) put forward 
“conditional tournament hypothesis”, that is, the change in risk by mid-year 
underperformers should be positively correlated with economic activity. 
In this paper, we explore how the flow-performance relationship varies both over 
time as economic activity changes and cross-sectionally with fund attributes, what 
types of incentives this creates for fund managers to modify the risk of their portfolios 
in response to their interim performance, and how the incentives and the resulting 
tournament behavior are affected by the strength and the convexity of the 
flow-performance relationship. 
III Data and Methodology 
(A) Sample Description 
We obtain fund flow, return, and other fund characteristics data from the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database for the period January 1975 – 
December 2006. Apart from mutual fund data, we use the risk-free rate, market return,  
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Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors, and Carhart (1997) momentum 
factor, which were obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund Monthly Returns and 
Fama-French Factors files. Data on real GDP growth rate is downloaded from 
EconStats
1. 
In line with prior studies, we focus on the sample of US domestic equity mutual 
funds classified as aggressive growth (AG), growth and income (GI), and long-term 
growth (LG) funds. We restrict our sample to growth-oriented funds since they are 
evidenced by the attention they receive from both the financial press and direct 
investor involvement, and they are most widely followed and often-ranked class of 
publicly traded funds. We exclude funds closed to investors, index funds, and funds of 
funds. CRSP reports funds’ data at the class share level. The different share classes of 
the same fund only differ with respect to their fee structure or their minimum 
investment requirements, but are backed by the same portfolio of assets. So for funds 
with multiple share classes, we only keep one representative class with the largest 
TNA. We also eliminated funds that merged with other funds during the fund-year and 
two groups of funds for which the flow data are exceptionally noisy: funds with less 
than 2 full years of return history and funds whose total net assets never reached $15 
million during their existence. Our final sample consists of 2065 funds. For each fund, 
we select the largest contiguous sample period for which we have no missing 
observations for TNA or returns. This leaves us with a total of 15083 observations for 
the regressions. The summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1.   
(B) Variable Definitions 
We consider dollar flows because they directly determine the manager’s 
compensation. This is calculated as:   
,,, , 1 (1 ) it it it it Flow TNA r TNA − =− + ,  
                                                        
1 http://www.econstats.com/gdp/gdp__a1.htm.  
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where  , it TNA  is  fund i’s total net assets in year  t, and  , it r   is the fund’s return over 
the prior year. 
Fund performance can be measured in many ways. Here we adopt three most 
commonly used measures of performance in the literature on the flow-performance 
relationship: 
(1) Excess return, obtained as the fund’s return less the value-weighted market 
portfolio return. 
(2) One-factor alpha, obtained as the fund excess return less the product of 
excess market return and beta. Each month we estimate beta of one-factor model by 
regressing the excess fund returns on the excess market returns using data from the 
previous 24 months. 
, it it it t it rM K T R F e α β =+ +         
where  it r  is the return on a portfolio in excess of the one-month T-bill return; 
t MKTRF  is the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, 
Amex, and Nasdaq stocks; the residual  it e   reflects the idiosyncratic risk.   
(3) Four-factor alpha, obtained as the fund excess return less the sum of the 
products of each of the four factor realizations and the corresponding factor loadings. 
Each month we estimate factor loadings of a four-factor model by regressing the 
excess fund returns on the excess market return, the SMB, HML, and momentum 
factors using data from the previous 24 months. 
it it it t it t it t it t it r b MKTRF s SMB h HML p UMD e α =+ + + + + ,  
where MKTRF is the excess return on a value-weighted aggregate market proxy; and 
SMB, HML, and UMD are returns on value-weighted, zero-investment, 
factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum 
in stock returns.  
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For each performance measure, we use each fund’s performance ranking relative 
to other funds in the same period, which is commonly reported in consumer 
periodicals. A fund’s fractional rank represents its percentile performance relative to 
other funds in the same period, and ranges from 0 to 1. For convenience of 
comparison, we follow the convention in the literature to break the funds’ fractional 
ranks down into three subgroups by their relative performance in the same period: 
isolating the top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent quintiles from the middle 60 
percent of funds
2. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we restrict this piecewise linear 
relationship to be continuous by defining: 
,1 , - 1    min( ,  0.2); it it Bottom Rank − =  
,1 , - 1 ,1 min( - , 0.6); it it it Middle Rank Bottom −− =  
,1 , - 1 ,1 ,1 min( - - , 0.2); it it it it Top Rank Bottom Middle −− − =  
where  ,- 1 it Rank   denotes the rank of fund  i in  year  -1 t . 
We employ a number of control variables in the various regression specifications, 
which can be viewed as two types: one is time-series variable, which we interact with 
performance variables to capture the time-variation of flow-performance relationship 
and the effect on tournament behavior; the other is cross-sectional variables, which 
are funds’ attributes that have been found by the existing literature to have an impact 
on flows from investor. More importantly, we also interact these variables with 
performance variables to explore the impacts of these variables on the convexity of 
flow-performance relationship and the tournament behavior. The time-series variable 
we use is the real GDP growth rate, which is computed as 100 times the difference of 
the log of annual GDP measured in billions of chained 2000 dollars.   
                                                        
2 Though not reported here, we also run regressions by breaking the performance rank down into five 
equal subgroups of 20 percent each. The results points in the same direction and with similar economic 
and statistical significances.  
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For the cross-sectional variables, we include expenses expressed in percentages, 
the age of the fund in years, funds’ prior relative size, funds’ prior volatility, and 
funds’ family size. Investors pay many different types of fees to buy and hold mutual 
funds, including up-front fees (loads or sales commissions) and ongoing fees 
(reflected in the fund’s expense ratio). Since we focus on exploring the 
flow-performance relationship, in this paper we are interested in the total fees charged 
to investors rather than the individual components of fees. Thus, following Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) we adopt the total fees as a measure of marketing expenses. Total fees 
are computed as the summation of the annual expense ratio and one-seventh of total 
load fees because the average holding period of funds is seven years. The initial 
relative size is defined as  ,1 ,1 / it it i TNA TNA −− ∑ .  
The time-variation of potential factors affecting the flow-performance 
relationship is reported in Figure 1. The time-variation of real GDP growth rate, 
average age, average total fees and average family size are shown in Panel A, B, C 
and D respectively. From these panels, we can see that variation in all four factors is 
substantial in the sample period. The fact intensifies the meaning of exploring the 
effects of these factors on the flow-performance relationship and tournament behavior. 
To examine the tournament hypothesis, we divide each calendar year in the 
sample period into two equal sub-periods of six months each. We compute the 
idiosyncratic risk of the fund for each sub-period of the year as the standard deviation 
of the estimated monthly fund residual using the market model for a particular 
sub-period. Specifically, the idiosyncratic risk for fund  i for  sub-period s (s=1, 2) 
of year t, denoted by  , ()
s
it σ ε , is given by the standard deviation of the monthly 
residual  ,
s
it ε . The fund residual is estimated as: 
,, , , , ( ) ˆ ˆ {( ) },
s
it it it it mt t s rr εα β ∈Γ =− +  
where  ( ) {1,...,6} s Γ=  for  1 s = ; and  ( ) {7,...,12} s Γ =  for  2 s = .  
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In the above equation,  , it r  denotes the return in excess of the one month US 
T-bill return for fund  i during month t, and  , mt r  denotes the excess return on the 
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio for month t . We obtain the parameters 
estimates  , ˆit α  and  , ˆ
it β  using monthly fund returns for the 24 months immediately 
preceding year t. We estimated the change in idiosyncratic risk of fund  i for year t 
as 
21
,, , () () it it it σ σε σε Δ= − . 
(C) Methodology 
We follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) to run piecewise regressions on performance 
to explore the convexity of flow-performance relationship. Since Oliver and Tay 
(2008) provide evidence that the sensitivity of flow to performance varies at business 
cycle frequencies, which contradicts the Fama-MacBeth assumptions and could lead 
to misleading conclusions, we run an unbalanced panel, allowing for time fixed 
effects via a full set of year dummy variables and controlling for fund-specific effects 
by using standard errors clustered by funds. The basic model would be: 
, 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1
1, 1 , 12 , 1 , 1 3 , 1 , 1
( ) ( )
***
it it it it
it it it it it it
Flow Year dummies Controls Top Middle Bottom
Top Cvx Middle Cvx Bottom Cvx
α αα
ββ β
− −−
−− −− −−
=+ + + +
++ +
 (1) 
where  , it Cvx  is the general term that indicates the factors inducing the convexity of 
the flow-performance relationship. 
The basic model for exploring the tournament hypothesis
3 is: 
11 1
,, , , , 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) * it it it it it Year dummies Controls Rank Rank Cvx σα σ ε β γ − Δ= + + + +    (2) 
                                                        
3 As a robust check we repeat our regressions by using the total risk and systematic risk as risk 
measures. Though not reported here for brevity, the results are weaker than that using idiosyncratic risk 
as risk measure. It is reasonable since that underperformers want to catch up by generating “spurious 
alphas” which is achieved by raising the idiosyncratic risk.  
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IV Flow-Performance Relationship 
Previous research on the relationship between investment flows and past 
performance has demonstrated that consumers react strongly and asymmetrically to 
historical returns. We are primarily interested in exploring what types of incentives 
this creates for fund managers to modify the risk of their portfolios, and how these 
incentives vary both over business cycle and cross-sectionally with fund attributes. 
These incentives are affected by the strength and the convexity of the 
flow-performance relationship. Hence, in this section we begin with an attempt to 
explore the flow-performance relationship, and more importantly, how the sensitivity 
of investor flows to previous performance varies both over time with economic 
activity and cross-sectionally with fund attributes. 
(A) The Shape of Flow-Performance Relationship 
In this subsection, we try to estimate the effects of past performance and other 
characteristics on the flow of investments into a fund. A number of early papers report 
a positive linear relationship between asset growth and the performance of individual 
funds. Since the seminal work by Ippolito (1992), especially after Sirri and Tufano 
(1998), a large and active literature has confirmed the existence of a convex 
relationship between flows and past performance, which means that mutual fund 
investors respond asymmetrically to the past performance: the mutual funds that 
performed worse than the competitors do not experience as significant an outflow of 
invested capital. 
To examine the flow-performance relationship, we run the following piecewise 
linear regression: 
, 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1 ( ) ( ) it it it it Flow Year dummies Controls Top Middle Bottom α αα − −− =+ + + +  (3) 
As we are interested in asymmetric responses to top and bottom performance, we 
structure the analysis using piecewise linear regression, which allows us to separately  
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calculate the sensitivity of flow to performance in each of three performance quintile. 
The coefficients on these piecewise decompositions of fractional ranks represent the 
slope of the flow-performance relationship over their range of sensitivity. 
The regression results are presented in Table 2 with three specifications I - III, 
each representing for one performance measure. For all specifications, there is a 
significantly negative effect between flows and fund age, and a significantly positive 
relation between flows and fund family size. That is, the younger the fund is and/or 
the larger the fund family size is, the more dollar flows attracted by this fund. In line 
with the existing literature, we find that there is a significantly positive relation 
between flow and relative performance both for top quintile and middle quintile but 
there is no significant relation for bottom quintile, which suggests a convex 
flow-performance relationship. To explore the convexity, we perform a one-sided 
t-test for all the three specifications with the null hypothesis H0 that the estimated 
coefficient for Top quintile ( 1 α ) is smaller than the estimated coefficient for Bottom 
quintile ( 3 α ). From the one-sided t-test results, we can see that the convexity of 
flow-performance relationship is robust to all the performance measures. And the 
convexity is statistically significant at 1% level of confidence for specifications based 
on excess return and one-factor alpha, at 5% level of confidence for specification 
based on four-factor alpha. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the existing literature. The 
flow-performance relationship is positive and convex, that is, mutual fund investors 
chase returns, flocking to funds with the highest previous returns, but failing to flee 
from poor performers. 
(B) Effect of Economic Activity on the Flow-Performance Relationship 
We have already seen that investor flows react asymmetrically to previous 
performance. Our objective in this subsection is to examine the dynamic feature of the  
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flow-performance relationship. To explore the sensitivity of investor flows to previous 
performance along the business cycle, we construct interaction term by multiplying 
the fractional rank with the proxy,  , it egdp , for economic activity in the following 
regression: 
, 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1
1 , 1, 2 , 1, 3 , 1,
( ) ( )
***
it it it it
it it it it it it
Flow Year dummies Controls Top Middle Bottom
Top egdp Middle egdp Bottom egdp
α αα
ββ β
− −−
−−−
=+ + + +
++ +
 (4) 
where  GDP GDP egdp g g =−, and  GDP g   denotes the real GDP growth rate in year  t. 
For the above regression, we can decompose the total effect of a change in 
performance on investor flows in the following way: 
,, ,
,
,1 ,1 ,1 , (* )
it it it
it
it it it it
dFlow Flow Flow
egdp
dPerformance Performance Performance egdp −− −
∂∂
=+
∂∂
    ( 5 )  
The effects can be interpreted as follows: Under average economic activity, that 
is when the GDP growth rate is equal to its sample mean, the second term in the RHS 
of (5) is equal to 0. In that case, the total effect of past performance on flows is just 
given by the partial derivative of flows on performance. Therefore, the coefficient of 
flows on previous performance can be interpreted as the sensitivity of flows to 
performance under average economic activity. Otherwise, when economic activity is 
strong (weak), that is when the GDP growth rate is larger (smaller) than its sample 
mean, the total effect of previous performance on flows is equal to the partial 
derivative of flows on previous performance plus the product of economic activity 
and the partial derivative of flows on the interaction item. Therefore, the sensitivity of 
flows to previous performance is an increasing function of economic activity if and 
only if the coefficient on the interaction item is positive. 
Table 3 reports the results of our analysis with specifications I - III. The results 
can be interpreted as follows: The convexity of the flow-performance relationship is  
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an increasing function of economic activity if and only if the coefficient of 
,1 , * it it Top egdp −  is strictly larger than the coefficient of  ,1 , * it it Bottom egdp − . We can 
observe that investor flows react more to funds in the top quintile during years with 
strong economic activity. From the one-sided t-test results, we can see that the effect 
is statistically significant at 5% level of confidence for the specifications with rank 
based on excess return and one-factor alpha. However, the effect is not statistically 
significant for the specification based on four-factor alpha. In the case of Oliver and 
Tay (2008), the results based on four-factor alpha are also weaker than that based on 
excess return and one-factor alpha. We conjecture that this is because the four-factor 
alpha excludes the momentum effect. 
It is important to note that the coefficients for the top performance and the top 
interaction item are of the same magnitude, which implies that even small fluctuations 
of the economic activity have a large impact on the convexity degree of the 
flow-performance relationship. For example, if the GDP growth rate increases by 2%, 
the slope for the top quintile would be twice as large as that under the average 
economic activity but there is no big change for the slope of the bottom quintile. This 
would largely increase the sensitivity of the fund flows to previous performance. 
Taking consideration of the real GDP growth rate’s fluctuations illustrated in Panel A 
of Figure 1, it is not surprising that the convexity degree of flow-performance 
relationship is highly sensitive to the sample period.   
The result reinforces the empirical results of Oliver and Tay (2008)
4. Recalling 
that we set no constraints on the fund front load and rear load in our sample, the result 
suggests that the effect of economic activity on the flow-performance relationship is 
robust to fund load type.   
                                                        
4 As a robust check we repeat our regressions on the sample restricted to no-load funds, that is, we 
exclude funds with front loads and funds with rear loads strictly larger than 1% from our sample. 
Though not reported here for the sake of brevity, our results are qualitatively unchanged for this 
alternative sample.  
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(C) Effects of Fund Attributes on the Flow-Performance Relationship 
In last subsection, we have already explored how the sensitivity of investor flows 
to previous performance varies over time. In this subsection, we would extensively 
examine the effects of fund attributes on the convexity degree of the fund 
flow-performance relationship. Following the literature investigating factors affecting 
the convexity of the flow-performance relationship, here we concentrate on three 
factors, namely fund age, total fees and family size.   
Similarly with the method adopted in subsection (B), we explore the effects of 
fund attributes by including interaction variables, which are constructed as the 
products of performance rank and fund attributes. Specifically, we multiply previous 
performance rank with the deviation of log of fund age from its sample mean, 
deviation of prior total fees from its sample mean and prior relative family size. We 
adopt the real values of interaction terms instead of using dummy variables to split the 
sample so as to achieve continuous effects. The regressions exploring the effects of 
fund age, total fees, family size and the cross-sectional variables on flow-performance 
relationship are presented in Panel A, B, C and D of Table 4 respectively.   
,, ,
,1
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 (* )
it it it
it
it it it it
dFlow Flow Flow
Cvx
dPerformance Performance Performance Cvx
−
−− − −
∂∂
=+
∂∂
   (6) 
Similarly, the results can be interpreted as follows: The convexity of the 
flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of  ,1 it Cvx −  if and only if the 
coefficient of  ,1 ,1 * it it Top Cvx −−   is strictly larger than the coefficient of 
,1 ,1 * it it Bottom Cvx −− . Note that here the  ,1 it Cvx −  denote fund attributes, namely fund 
age, total fees and family size.   
Panel A of Table 4 provides evidence that fund age has a significantly positive 
effect on the degree of convexity of the flow-performance relationship, that is, older 
funds suffer a more convex flow-performance relationship. The effect is statistically  
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significant at 1% level of confidence for all the three specifications. The most striking 
feature of this panel is that the effect of age on the convexity comes mainly from its 
impact on the bottom quintile. This should not come as a surprise since older funds 
have longer history, the flows they experienced should be less sensitive to their most 
recent performance. When older funds perform badly, they would not experience as 
much outflow as younger funds. There is no big difference between older funds and 
younger funds when they outperform and experience inflows. This point verifies the 
empirical results illustrated by Figure 1 and Figure 2 of Chevalier and Ellison (1999).   
From Panel B of Table 4, we can find that the convexity of flow-performance 
relationship is a decreasing function of total fees. This is consistent with Hu et al. 
(2006) and Huang et al. (2007). It’s important to note that our one-sided t-test null 
hypothesis H0 is that the estimated coefficient for Top quintile is smaller than the 
estimated coefficient for Bottom quintile. The alternative hypothesis H1 would be that 
the estimated coefficient for Top quintile is not smaller than the estimated coefficient 
for Bottom quintile. Since the p-values of one-sided t-tests for these three 
specifications are 0.994, 0.997, and 0.986 respectively, the corresponding p-values of 
the alternative one-sided t-tests should be 0.006, 0.003, and 0.014 respectively. 
Therefore, the negative effect of total fees on the convexity is statistically significant 
at 5% level of confidence for all these three specifications. 
Panel C of Table 4 shows that the convexity of flow-performance relationship 
increases with fund’s family size, that is, fund belonging to a larger family is inclined 
to have a more convex flow-performance relationship. Similar with the case of fund 
age effect, the effect of family size on the convexity also comes mainly from its 
impact on the bottom quintile. The intuition behind this evidence is that funds 
affiliated with larger family size have better market reputation. Investors would flock 
to these funds when they rank in top quintile as usual, but failing to flee from these 
funds even if they rank in bottom quintile. It is important to note that for convenience 
we adopt prior relative family size as proxy rather than deviation from its sample  
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mean since family size has larger magnitude than other variables. So the 
understanding of coefficients a1 to a3 becomes: the effect of previous performance on 
flows when the prior relative family size is equal to 0. Since the prior relative family 
size is always bigger than 0, the shape of flow-performance relationship is mainly 
determined by the interaction items. The insignificant one-sided t-test results of (a1-a3) 
do not affect the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. 
Panel D of Table 4 reports the joint effects of fund attributes on the 
flow-performance relationship. We can see that the effects of these variables on the 
flow-performance are consistent with their separate effects as explored in above 
panels. Overall, the relationship between fund flows and performance is convex, and 
the degree of convexity of the flow-performance relationship increases with fund age 
and family size, while decreasing with total fees.   
(D) The Joint Effects on the Flow-Performance Relationship 
Table 5 presents the joint effects of economic activity and fund attributes on the 
flow-performance relationship. The effects retain in the same direction and with 
similar economic and statistical significances. The results of this section can be 
summarized as follows: 
(i) Generally, the flow-performance relationship of our sample is positive and 
convex. 
(ii) The convexity of the flow-performance relationship positively varies with the 
economic activity.   
(iii) The convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies with fund 
attributes. Specifically, fund age and family size have significantly positive effects on 
the degree of the convexity; while total fees have a significantly negative effect on the 
degree of the convexity.  
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(iv) The effects of economic activity and fund attributes remain unchanged even 
when we pool them together. 
(v) Given the large fluctuations of these factors as illustrated in Figure 1, the 
results provide reasonable explanation why the convexity degree of the 
flow-performance relationship varies from sample to sample. 
V Tournament Behavior 
In this section, we come to the question that most interests us: investigating how 
mutual fund managers adjust the risk of their portfolios in response to the incentives 
created by the flow-performance relationship. These incentives are affected by the 
strength and the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. And we have already 
shown that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies not only along 
business cycle but also cross-sectionally with fund attributes. Therefore, our objective 
in this section is to explore how these incentives and the resulting inter-temporal 
risk-shifting behavior of mutual fund managers vary with economic activity and fund 
attributes. 
11 1
,, , , , 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) * it it it it it Year dummies Controls Rank Rank Cvx σα σ ε β γ − Δ= + + + +    (2) 
From the regression model shown in equation (2) and the chain rule, we can 
decompose the total effect of a change in performance rank on the risk-shifting 
behavior as follows: 
    
,, ,
,1 11 1
,, , , 1 (*)
it it it
it
it it it it
d
Cvx
dRank Rank Rank Cvx
σ σσ
−
−
Δ∂ Δ ∂ Δ
=+
∂∂
                     ( 7 )  
The effects can be interpreted as follows:  ,1 it Cvx −  would strengthen the 
tournament behavior if and only if the coefficient for 
1
,, 1 * it it Rank Cvx −  is negative;  
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,1 it Cvx −  would weaken the tournament behavior if and only if the coefficient for 
1
,, 1 * it it Rank Cvx −  is  positive. 
Table 6 reports the effect of economic activity on the tournament behavior. We 
can find that the coefficients for the interaction terms are negative for specifications 
with performance rank based on excess return and one-factor alpha. This indicates 
that when economic activity is strong, the fund managers do adjust their risk in the 
direction of the incentive we analyzed and the magnitude of the response is larger 
when the economic activity is stronger. Recall from subsection A of Section IV that 
the convexity of the flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of 
economic activity. The positive effect of economic activity on the magnitude of 
tournament behavior strongly suggests that the risk-shifting behavior of fund 
managers does react to the implicit incentive created by the time-varying 
flow-performance relationship. Note that the coefficients for the performance rank 
and interaction item is -0.131 and 0.045 respectively for the specification based on 
four-factor alpha. This is consistent with the results in Table 3, namely, the 
flow-performance relationship is convex under average economic activity but the 
effect of economic activity is not statistically significant, which we conjecture is due 
to the exclusion of momentum effect in four-factor alpha. 
Table 7 presents the effects of fund attributes on the tournament behavior. From 
Panel A of Table 7, we can observe that the coefficients for the interaction terms, 
1
, *l n it Rank e age, are negative for all the three specifications. The effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level of confidence for all the three specifications. It is consistent 
with the effect of fund age on the flow-performance relationship as we explored in 
Panel A of Table 4. Therefore, fund age has a significantly positive effect on the 
tournament behavior.  
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From Panel B of Table 7, we can find that the coefficients for the interaction 
terms, 
1
, * it Rank elfee , are positive for all the three specifications. The effect is 
statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence for all the three specifications, 
which is consistent with the effect of total fees on the flow-performance relationship 
as we explored in Panel B of Table 4. Hence, total fees have a significantly negative 
effect on the tournament behavior. 
From Panel C of Table 7, we can find that the coefficients for the interaction 
terms, 
1
, * it Rank lrfsize, are negative for all the three specifications, that is, family size 
has a positive effect on the tournament behavior. The effect is statistically significant 
at the 10% level of confidence for specifications with performance rank based on 
excess return and one-factor alpha. The effect is somewhat weaker for the 
specification with performance rank based on four-factor alpha. This is consistent 
with the effect of family size on the flow-performance relationship as we explored in 
last section. Panel D of Table 7 presents the cross-sectional joint effects on the 
tournament behavior. We can see that the separate effects of these factors remain 
unchanged even when we pool them together. 
Table 8 reports the joint effects of all these factors on the tournament behavior. 
We can see that the effects of these factors remain in the same direction and with 
similar economic and statistical significances even when we pool them together. 
Consistent with the direction suggested in last section, we can find that the economic 
activity, fund age, and family size have significantly positive effects on the magnitude 
of the tournament behavior, while total fees have a significantly negative effect on the 
magnitude of the tournament behavior. 
So far, we have examined how the sources of implicit incentives generated from 
the varying flow-performance relationship shape the tournament behavior. As shown 
in last section, economic activity, fund age and family size have significantly positive 
effects on the convexity degree of flow-performance relationship and total fees have a  
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significantly negative effect on the convexity degree of the flow-performance 
relationship; and now we provide evidence that the economic activity, fund age and 
family size strengthen the magnitude of the tournament behavior and total fees 
weaken the magnitude of the tournament behavior. This fact strongly indicates that the 
convexity degree of the flow-performance relationship has a significantly positive 
effect on the magnitude of the tournament behavior. Taking consideration of the 
substantial fluctuations of these factors as illustrated in Figure 1, it is reasonable to 
find that the empirical results of the tournament hypothesis highly depends on the 
sample chosen.   
VI Conclusion 
In this paper, we interpret the flow-performance relationship as an incentive 
scheme implicitly given to mutual fund managers by mutual fund investors. We show 
that the flow-performance relationship varies not only along business cycle but also 
across fund attributes. Specifically, the convexity of the flow-performance 
relationship is an increasing function of economic activity, fund age and family size; 
and the convexity of the flow-performance relationship is a decreasing function of 
total fees. All these make our work currently the most comprehensive one in exploring 
the convexity of flow-performance relationship. 
In succession, we investigate the link between the factors affecting the convexity 
of the flow-performance relationship and the inter-temporal risk-shifting behavior of 
fund managers. We provide evidence that mutual fund managers respond to this 
incentive scheme: funds alter their portfolios between June and December in a manner 
consistent with the implicit risk-shifting incentive generated from the 
flow-performance relationship. That is, economic activity, fund age and family size 
have significantly positive effects on the magnitude of the tournament behavior, and 
total fees have a significantly negative effect on the magnitude of the tournament 
behavior. The evidence strongly indicates that the higher the convexity degree of the 
flow-performance relationship is, the higher the magnitude of tournament behavior is.  
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These findings provide a fresh perspective on the literature of the tournament 
hypothesis and give a reasonable explanation of the previous contradictory empirical 
findings of the tournament hypothesis in mutual fund industry. 
Different from the conventional tournament hypothesis: mid-year loser funds, 
those with below-median performance, tend to increase portfolio’s volatility in the 
latter part of the year more than mid-year winner funds, based on our results we 
conclude that although the convexity of the flow-performance relationship in the 
mutual fund industry does produce implicit incentives for fund managers to modify 
risk-taking behavior as a function of their prior performance, whether or not the 
mid-year losers increase the risk of their portfolios highly depends on the convexity 
degree of the flow-performance relationship. 
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Figure 1: Time-Variation of Factors 
This figure plots the time-variation of factors which affect the flow-performance relationship during 
our sample period: 1975-2006. The time-variation of real GDP growth rate, average age, average total 
fees and average family size are shown in Panel A, B, C and D respectively. Real GDP growth rate is 
computed as 100 times the difference of the log of annual GDP measured in billions of chained 2000 
dollars. Each year, average age is computed as the mean of fund age (years) in the year; average total 
fees is computed as the mean of total fees (%) in the year; average family size is computed as the mean 
of family size ($m) in the year. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics for the fund flow, performance and control variables. The 
sample includes US domestic equity funds that have records in the CRSP Survivor-Bias free U.S. 
Mutual Fund database from 1975 to 2006. By restricting the sample to growth-oriented funds and 
eliminating other noisy factors, only 2065 funds are left in the sample with 15083 observations. Fund 
flow is defined as: 
,, , , 1 (1 )
it it it it Flow TNA r TNA
− =− + , where 
, it TNA  is fund i ’s total net assets at time  t , 
and 
, it r  is the fund’s return over the prior year. Size is defined as 
,, 1 /
it it i TNA TNA
− ∑ . Excess return is 
obtained as the fund’s return less the value-weighted market portfolio return. Each month we estimate 
factor loadings of a one-factor/four-factor model using data from the previous 24 months. And the 
one-factor/four-factor alpha is obtained as the fund excess return less the sum of the products of each of 
the factor realizations and the corresponding factor loadings.   
Variables Mean      Standard  Deviation 
      
Flow 15.74    392.5 
Excess return  0.001    0.12 
1-factor alpha  -0.005    0.11 
4-factor alpha  -0.010    0.09 
Size (%)  0.20    0.66 
Age (years)    13.4    12.2 
Expense ratio (%)  1.23    0.52 
Total fees (%)  1.55    0.71 
Family size ($m)  7480    20812 
Turn ratio  1.01    1.71 
Volatility 0.05    0.02 
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)  3.07    0.02 
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Table 2: Flow-Performance Relationship 
This table examines the flow-performance relationship. For each specification (I-III), we run an 
unbalanced panel, allowing for time fixed effects via a full set of year dummy variables and control for 
fund-specific effects by using standard errors clustered by funds. Note that coefficients for the year 
dummies are not reported for brevity. For each regression, the dependent variable, 
, it Flow , is defined 
as:
,,, , 1 (1 )
it it it it Flow TNA r TNA
− =− + , where 
, it TNA  is fund i ’s total net assets at time  t , and 
, it r  is 
the fund’s return over the prior year. Each year, funds are ranked between 0 and 1 based on their 
previous year performance which is measured by excess return, one-factor alpha, or four-factor alpha. 
We report below each triplet of rank variables the difference between the coefficient of the top quintile 
and that of the corresponding bottom quintile and p-value resulting from the one-sided t-test. 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                  
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                 
Sizei,t-1   22.17  0.467    20.85  0.495    20.37  0.498 
Agei,t   -1.95  0.005    -1.99  0.004    -2.14  0.002 
Expensei,t-1   -3.92  0.613    -2.09  0.788    0.22  0.978 
Lnfsizei,t-1   5.41  0.026    6.34  0.010    6.46  0.009 
Volatilityi,t-1   333.7  0.066    199.2  0.246    188.1  0.259 
Turnoveri,t-1   -2.66  0.066    -0.76  0.585    -0.05  0.965 
                     
                  
a1: Topi,t-1    505.5  0.002    496.8  0.000    320.7  0.012 
a2: Middlei,t-1   293.9  0.000    277.3  0.000    212.7  0.000 
a3: Bottomi,t-1     -51.1  0.481    -106.3  0.210    29.45  0.737 
                  
a1-a3   556.6  0.000    603.1  0.000    291.2  0.016 
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Table 3: Effect of Economic Activity on the Flow-Performance Relationship 
This table examines the economic activity effect on the flow-performance relationship. For each 
specification (I-III), we run an unbalanced panel, allowing for time fixed effects via a full set of year 
dummy variables and control for fund-specific effects by using standard errors clustered by funds. Note 
that coefficients for the year dummies are not reported for brevity. For each regression, the dependent 
variable, 
, it Flow , is defined as:
,,, , 1 (1 )
it it it it Flow TNA r TNA
− =− + . Each year, funds are ranked between 
0 and 1 based on their previous year performance which is measured by excess return, one-factor alpha, 
or four-factor alpha.  egdp  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its 
sample mean. We report below each triplet of rank variables the difference between the coefficient of 
the top quintile and that of the corresponding bottom quintile and p-value resulting from the one-sided 
t-test. 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef. P-value 
               
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
               
Sizei,t-1    21.89  0.473  20.38 0.506  20.50 0.495 
Agei,t   -1.96  0.004    -2.00  0.004    -2.15  0.002 
Expensei,t-1   -3.88  0.615    -1.59  0.838    0.18  0.982 
Lnfsizei,t-1   5.14  0.033    6.30  0.010    6.47  0.009 
Volatilityi,t-1   146.5  0.432    231.8  0.183    211.9  0.208 
Turnoveri,t-1   -2.99  0.042    -0.93  0.505    -0.20  0.873 
                     
               
a1: Topi,t-1    574.2  0.001  533.3 0.000  336.4 0.013 
a2: Middlei,t-1    297.9  0.000  280.7 0.000  215.6 0.000 
a3: Bottomi,t-1    -74.3  0.304   -109.1 0.204  43.43 0.632 
               
a1-a3    648.5  0.000  642.4 0.000  292.9 0.021 
                     
               
a4: Top*egdp    275.3  0.029    265.2  0.010    114.4  0.154 
a5: Middle*egdp    33.39  0.062    24.49  0.119    21.59  0.129 
a6:  Bottom*egdp    -59.42  0.174   -40.99 0.400  78.83 0.203 
               
a4-a6    334.7  0.006  306.2 0.003  35.57 0.350 
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Table 4: Effects of Fund Attributes on the Flow-Performance Relationship 
This table examines the fund attributes’ effect on the flow-performance relationship. The separate 
effects of fund age, total fees, and family size on the flow-performance relationship are reported in 
Panel A, B, and C respectively. Panel D presents the cross-sectional joint effects. Each year, 
ln ea g e measures the deviations of the log(age) from its sample mean;  elfee measures the deviations 
of prior total fees from its sample mean;  lrfsize measures the prior relative family size. We report 
below each triplet of rank variables the difference between the coefficient of the top quintile and that of 
the corresponding bottom quintile and p-value resulting from the one-sided t-test. 
Panel A: Fund Age 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                     
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                  
Sizei,t-1   19.84  0.511    17.65  0.558    18.58  0.529 
Expensei,t-1   -2.88 0.71    -0.75  0.923    1.25  0.875 
Lnfsizei,t-1   5.67  0.019    6.61  0.007    6.63  0.007 
Volatilityi,t-1   377.6  0.034    231.8  0.168    199.7  0.223 
Turnoveri,t-1   -1.78  0.194    -0.63  0.630    -0.21  0.868 
                  
                  
a1: Topi,t-1   562.9  0.000    520.8  0.000    408.3  0.001 
a2: Middlei,t-1   179.2  0.000    169.7  0.000    124.8  0.000 
a3: Bottomi,t-1   207.8  0.003    158.4  0.046    237.1  0.003 
                  
a1-a3   355.2  0.008    362.4  0.003    171.2  0.106 
                  
                  
a4: Top*elnage    323.1  0.289    375.7  0.222    -113.6  0.636 
a5: Middle*elnage    361.4  0.000    321.1  0.000    273.6  0.001 
a6: Bottom*elnage    -818.2  0.000    -779.7  0.000    -680.9  0.000 
                  
a4-a6   1141.3  0.000    1155.4  0.000    567.3  0.008 
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Panel B: Total Fees 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                  
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                  
Sizei,t-1   22.95  0.453    21.48  0.482    21.29  0.479 
Agei,t   -1.94  0.004    -2.01  0.003    -2.16  0.002 
Lnfsizei,t-1   5.31  0.028    6.22  0.010    6.25  0.011 
Volatilityi,t-1   338.6  0.062    204.9  0.232    192.8  0.243 
Turnoveri,t-1   -2.45  0.082    -0.83  0.542    -0.08  0.949 
                  
                  
a1: Topi,t-1   546.8  0.001    530.3  0.000    360.8  0.008 
a2: Middlei,t-1   289.8  0.000    273.0  0.000    210.3  0.000 
a3: Bottomi,t-1   -25.02  0.726    -78.33  0.348    40.43  0.643 
                  
a1-a3   571.8  0.000    608.6  0.000    320.4  0.013 
                  
                  
a4: Top*elfee    -218.9  0.222    -293.4  0.101    -147.2  0.326 
a5: Middle*elfee    -151.5  0.002    -128.4  0.002    -97.2  0.013 
a6: Bottom*elfee    274.4  0.001    261.5  0.001    197.1  0.004 
                  
a4-a6   -493.3  0.994    -554.9  0.997    -344.3  0.986 
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Panel C: Family Size 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                     
Sizei,t-1   6.95 0.782    0.62  0.981    1.93  0.936 
Agei,t   -1.98 0.001    -2.09  0.001    -2.30  0.000 
Expensei,t-1   7.61 0.358    8.25  0.322    8.21  0.336 
Volatilityi,t-1    199.4  0.245   186.8  0.263  187.2  0.236 
Turnoveri,t-1   -2.26 0.093    -1.15  0.364    -0.19  0.875 
                
                
a1: Topi,t-1    312.3  0.035   252.4  0.045  257.8  0.022 
a2: Middlei,t-1    104.9  0.000   103.7  0.000  52.48  0.021 
a3: Bottomi,t-1    220.6  0.004   174.0  0.020  265.7  0.000 
                
a1-a3    91.7  0.280   78.38  0.298  -7.89  0.524 
                
                
a4: Top*lrfsize    263.7  0.208    283.4  0.117    158.1  0.325 
a5:  Middle*lrfsize    158.9  0.000   145.6  0.000  130.3  0.000 
a6: Bottom*lrfsize    -199.9  0.000    -184.1  0.000    -154.4  0.003 
                
a4-a6    463.7  0.011   467.4  0.005  312.6  0.016 
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Panel D: The Cross-Sectional Effects 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                  
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                     
Sizei,t-1   4.33  0.861    -2.37  0.925    0.67  0.978 
Volatilityi,t-1   254.5  0.135    218.6  0.182    210.1  0.175 
Turnoveri,t-1   -1.63  0.230    -1.18  0.351    -0.37  0.759 
                  
                  
a1: Topi,t-1   363.3  0.022    292.3  0.045    319.6  0.013 
a2: Middlei,t-1   34.30  0.210    33.8  0.230    4.15  0.886 
a3: Bottomi,t-1   402.8  0.000    363.2  0.000    403.8  0.000 
                  
a1-a3   -39.5  0.593    -70.8  0.669    -84.24  0.725 
                  
                  
a4: Top*elnage    247.6  0.351    215.9  0.402    -92.30  0.659 
a5: Middle*elnage    259.5  0.000    239.3  0.000    178.6  0.002 
a6: Bottom*elnage    -660.4  0.000    -648.7  0.000    -549.0  0.000 
                  
a4-a6   907.9  0.001    864.6  0.001    456.7  0.015 
                  
                  
a7: Top*elfee    -83.34  0.610    -105.0  0.525    -100.9  0.456 
a8: Middle*elfee    -45.65  0.203    -35.85  0.271    -20.2  0.555 
a9: Bottom*elfee    129.02  0.027    130.1  0.020    90.9  0.062 
                  
a7-a8   -212.4  0.882    -235.2  0.902    -191.7  0.923 
                  
                  
a10: Top*lrfsize    263.1  0.211    279.6  0.125    164.3  0.307 
a11: Middle*lrfsize    146.9  0.000    135.5  0.000    122.5  0.000 
a12: Bottom*lrfsize    -177.9  0.000    -164.9  0.001    -141.7  0.005 
                  
a11-a12   440.9  0.015    444.5  0.007    306.0  0.018 
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Table 5: The Joint Effects on the Flow-Performance Relationship 
This table examines the joint effects on the flow-performance relationship.  egdp measures  deviations 
in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Each year,  ln ea g e measures the 
deviations of the log(age) from its sample mean;  elfee measures the deviations of prior total fees from 
its sample mean;  lrfsize measures the prior relative family size. We report below each triplet of rank 
variables the difference between the coefficient of the top quintile and that of the corresponding bottom 
quintile and p-value resulting from the one-sided t-test. 
      I      II      III   
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
Sizei,t-1   4.03  0.871    -2.56  0.919    0.91  0.969 
Volatilityi,t-1    108.8  0.536   237.6  0.155  226.8  0.148 
Turnoveri,t-1   -1.92  0.159    -1.31  0.299    -0.53  0.661 
                
a1: Topi,t-1    438.4  0.007   335.4  0.024  342.7  0.011 
a2: Middlei,t-1   36.0  0.199    35.9  0.209    5.97  0.840 
a3: Bottomi,t-1    388.9  0.000   359.4  0.000  420.4  0.000 
a1-a3   49.53  0.385    -24.01  0.559    -77.73  0.703 
                
a4: Top*egdp    254.6  0.021    211.7  0.020    120.3  0.127 
a5: Middle*egdp    11.44  0.527    9.76  0.551    8.97  0.527 
a6: Bottom*egdp    1.304  0.973    -18.3  0.699    110.4  0.070 
a4-a6    253.3  0.013   230.0  0.009   9.91  0.456 
                
a7:  Top*elnage    217.9  0.411   169.3  0.513  -126.2 0.553 
a8:  Middle*elnage    256.8  0.000   237.8  0.000  177.8  0.002 
a9: Bottom*elnage    -654.5  0.000    -642.8  0.000    -546.9  0.000 
a7-a9    872.4  0.001   812.1  0.001  420.7  0.025 
                
a10: Top*elfee    -118.7  0.469    -116.5  0.481    -109.5  0.423 
a11: Middle*elfee    -44.6  0.213    -36.7  0.259    -20.3  0.554 
a12:  Bottom*elfee    130.8  0.025   132.7  0.018  91.39  0.061 
a10-a12   -249.5  0.917    -249.2  0.915    -200.9  0.930 
                
a13:  Top*lrfsize   254.3  0.222   274.3  0.130  163.6  0.306 
a14:  Middle*lrfsize    147.0  0.000   135.4  0.000  122.4  0.000 
a15: Bottom*lrfsize    -177.8  0.000    -164.9  0.001    -141.7  0.005 
a13-a15    432.1  0.016   439.2  0.007  305.2  0.018 
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Table 6: Effect of Economic-Activity on the Tournament Behavior 
This table examines the economic activity effect on the tournament behavior. For each regression, the 
dependent variable,
, it σ Δ , is defined as 
21
,, () ()
it it σ εσ ε − , where 
, ()
s
it σ ε  is defined as the standard 
deviation of the monthly residuals 
,
s
it ε . The fund monthly residual, 
,
s
it ε , is estimated as: 
,, , , , ( )
ˆ ˆ {( ) }
s
it it it it mt t s rr εα β
∈Γ =− + , where ( ) {1,...,6} s Γ = for s=1;  () { 7 , . . . , 1 2 }   s Γ = for s=2; 
, ˆ
it α  and 
,
ˆ
it β   are estimated by using monthly fund returns for the 24 months immediately preceding year t. Each 
year, funds are ranked between 0 and 1 based on their performance during the first six months of the 
year. Excess return is obtained as the fund’s return less the value-weighted market portfolio return. 
Each month we estimate factor loadings of a one-factor/four-factor model using data from the previous 
24 months. And the one-factor/four-factor alpha is obtained as the fund excess return less the sum of 
the products of each of the factor realizations and the corresponding factor loadings.  egdp measures 
the deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean.   
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                
lidiostd   -68.22  0.000    -67.34  0.000    -68.08  0.000 
Sizei,t-1   -0.012  0.485    -0.016  0.358    -0.016  0.387 
Agei,t   -0.005  0.000    -0.005  0.000    -0.005  0.000 
Expensei,t-1    0.259  0.000   0.259  0.000  0.252  0.000 
Lnfsizei,t-1   -0.014  0.043    -0.013  0.054    -0.015  0.034 
Turnoveri,t-1    0.047  0.000   0.048  0.000  0.048  0.000 
Rank    0.218  0.000   0.176  0.000  -0.131 0.000 
Rank*egdp   -0.032  0.256    -0.210  0.000    0.045  0.093 
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Table 7: Effects of Fund Attributes on the Tournament Behavior 
This table examines the fund attributes’ effect on the tournament behavior. The separate effects of fund 
age, total fees, and family size on the flow-performance relationship are reported in Panel A, B, and C 
respectively. Panel D presents the cross-sectional joint effects. For each regression, the dependent 
variable,
, it σ Δ , is defined as 
21
,, () ()
it it σ εσ ε − . Each year, funds are ranked between 0 and 1 based on 
their performance during the first six months of the year. Each year,  ln ea g e measures the deviations 
of the log(age) from its sample mean;  elfee measures the deviations of prior total fees from its sample 
mean;  lrfsize  measures the prior relative family size. 
Panel A: Fund Age 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                  
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                  
Lidiostd    -68.42  0.000   -68.49 0.000  -67.99 0.000 
Sizei,t-1    -0.013  0.438   -0.014 0.421  -0.020 0.255 
Expensei,t-1   0.260  0.000    0.260  0.000    0.256  0.000 
Lnfsizei,t-1    -0.014  0.043   -0.014 0.047  -0.015 0.032 
Turnoveri,t-1   0.046  0.000    0.047  0.000    0.048  0.000 
Rank   0.263  0.000    0.240  0.000    -0.103  0.003 
Rank*elnage    -0.165  0.000   -0.170 0.000  -0.132 0.000 
                            
 
Panel B: Total Fees 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                  
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                  
Lidiostd   -68.02  0.000    -68.03  0.000    -67.63  0.000 
Sizei,t-1   -0.022  0.222    -0.024  0.191    -0.025  0.199 
Agei,t   -0.006  0.000    -0.006  0.000    -0.006  0.000 
Lnfsizei,t-1   -0.027  0.000    -0.027  0.000    -0.026  0.000 
Turnoveri,t-1   0.055  0.000    0.056  0.000    0.055  0.000 
Rank   0.208  0.000    0.183  0.000    -0.158  0.000 
Rank*etotalfee   0.155  0.000   0.147 0.000  0.174 0.000 
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Panel C: Family Size 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
               
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
               
Lidiostd   -68.47  0.000    -68.49  0.000    -68.06  0.000 
Sizei,t-1   -0.014  0.443    -0.0140  0.423    -0.023  0.215 
Agei,t   -0.005  0.000    -0.005  0.000    -0.005  0.000 
Expensei,t-1    0.270  0.000  0.270 0.000  0.267 0.000 
Turnoveri,t-1    0.046  0.000  0.047 0.000  0.047 0.000 
Rank   0.234  0.000    0.212  0.000    -0.132  0.000 
Rank*lrfsize  -0.013  0.104    -0.013  0.070    -0.004  0.575 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: The Cross-Sectional Effects 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
               
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
               
Lidiostd   -67.94  0.000    -68.00  0.000    -67.49  0.000 
Sizei,t-1   -0.036  0.054    -0.035  0.068    -0.048  0.018 
Turnoveri,t-1    0.053  0.000  0.054 0.000  0.054 0.000 
Rank   0.281  0.000    0.258  0.000    -0.103  0.004 
Rank*elnage  -0.201  0.000    -0.206  0.000    -0.168  0.000 
Rank*etotalfee   0.157  0.000  0.148 0.000  0.182 0.000 
Rank*lrfsize   -0.018  0.023    -0.019  0.012    -0.008  0.261 
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Table 8: The Joint Effects on the Tournament Behavior 
This table examines the joint effects on the tournament behavior. For each regression, the dependent 
variable,
, it σ Δ , is defined as 
21
,, () ()
it it σ εσ ε − . Each year, funds are ranked between 0 and 1 based on 
their performance during the first six months of the year.  egdp  measures the deviations in percentage 
of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Each year,  ln ea g e measures the deviations of 
the log(age) from its sample mean;  elfee measures the deviations of prior total fees from its sample 
mean;  lrfsize  measures the prior relative family size. 
      I    II    III 
Rank based on:     Excess return    1-factor alpha    4-factor alpha 
   Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value   Coef.  P-value 
                  
Year dummies    YES      YES      YES   
                  
Lidiostd   -67.70  0.000    -66.79  0.000    -67.54  0.000 
Sizei,t-1   -0.037  0.049    -0.039  0.040    -0.048  0.018 
Turnoveri,t-1   0.053  0.000    0.055  0.000    0.054  0.000 
Rank   0.277  0.000    0.230  0.000    -0.096  0.009 
Rank*egdp   -0.027  0.332    -0.207  0.000    0.049  0.068 
Rank*elnage  -0.199  0.000    -0.186  0.000    -0.171  0.000 
Rank*etotalfee   0.158  0.000  0.153 0.000  0.182 0.000 
Rank*lrfsize   -0.018  0.024    -0.018  0.016    -0.008  0.265 
                            
 